
The Principles of Biology, Volume 2 (of 2)
Herbert Spencer

THE CLASSIC COLLECTION · 1860
"First Principles" by Herbert Spencer is a philosophical treatise written in the mid-19th century. The work is part of a larger series that aims to establish a systematic understanding of philosophy grounded in science, religion, and human experience. It explores the interplay between religion and science, seeking to reconcile their seemingly opposing views on existence and knowledge, and discusses the underlying truths present across various belief systems. The opening of the treatise introduces the ambitious scope of Spencer’s work, as he presents a framework for his philosophical inquiry. He begins with a discussion on the nature of human beliefs, suggesting that even widely-held misconceptions may contain elements of truth. By analyzing the historical perspectives on authority and governance, Spencer underscores the evolution of political thought from divine kingship to modern democratic ideals. He proposes that there is a common thread among all religions and philosophies — the acknowledgment of fundamental truths concerning existence that are often obscured by dogma. Thus, the groundwork is laid for his exploration of "the unknowable" and the "laws of the knowable," setting the stage for a deeper analysis of both the limitations and possibilities of human understanding.
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The growing belief in the universality of Law, is so conspicuous to all cultivated minds as scarcely to need illustration. None who read these pages will ask for proof that this has been the central element of intellectual progress. But though the fact is sufficiently familiar, the philosophy of the fact is not so; and it will be desirable now to consider it. Partly because the development of our conception of Law will so be rendered more comprehensible; but chiefly because our subsequent course will thus be facilitated; I propose here to enumerate the several conditions that determine the order in which the various relations among phenomena are discovered. Seeing, as we shall, the consequent necessity of this order; and enabled, as we shall also be, to estimate the future by inference from the past; we shall perceive how inevitable is our advance towards the ultimatum that has been indicated.
§ 36. The recognition of Law, being the recognition of uniformity of relations among phenomena, it follows that the order in which different groups of phenomena are reduced to law, must depend on the frequency and distinctness with which the uniform relations they severally present, are experienced. At any given stage of progress, those uniformities will be most recognized with which men’s minds have been oftenest and most strongly impressed. In proportion partly to the number of times a relation has been presented to consciousness (not merely to the senses); and in proportion partly to the vividness with which the terms of the relation have been cognized; will be the degree in which the constancy of connexion is perceived.
The frequency and impressiveness with which different classes of relations are repeated in conscious experience, thus primarily determining the succession in which they are generalized, there result certain derivative principles to which this succession must more immediately and obviously conform. First in importance comes the directness with which personal welfare is affected. While, among surrounding things, many do not appreciably influence the body in any way, some act detrimentally and some beneficially, in various degrees; and manifestly, those things whose actions on the organism are most influential, will, cæteris paribus, be those whose laws of action are earliest observed. Second in order, is the conspicuousness of one or both the phenomena between which a relation is to be perceived. On every side are countless phenomena so concealed as to be detected only by close observation; others not obtrusive enough to attract notice; others which moderately solicit the attention; others so imposing or vivid as to force themselves upon consciousness; and supposing incidental conditions to be the same, these last will of course be among the first to have their relations generalized. In the third place, we have the absolute frequency with which the relations occur. There are coexistences and sequences of all degrees of commonness, from those which are ever present to those which are extremely rare; and it is clear that the rare coexistences and sequences, as well as the sequences which are very long in taking place, will not be reduced to law so soon as those which are familiar and rapid. Fourthly has to be added the relative frequency of occurrence. Many events and appearances are more or less limited to times and places; and as a relation which does not exist within the environment of an observer, cannot be cognized by him, however common it may be elsewhere or in another age, we have to take account of the surrounding physical circumstances, as well as the state of society, of the arts, and of the sciences—all of which affect the frequency with which certain groups of facts are exposed to observation. The fifth corollary to be noticed, is, that the succession in which different classes of phenomena are reduced to law, depends in part on their simplicity. Phenomena presenting great composition of causes or conditions, have their essential relations so masked, that it requires accumulated experiences to impress upon consciousness the true connexion of antecedents and consequents they involve. Hence, other things equal, the progress of generalization will be from the simple to the complex; and this it is which M. Comte has wrongly asserted to be the sole regulative principle of the progress. Sixth, and last, comes the degree of abstractness. Concrete relations are the earliest acquisitions. The colligation of any group of these into a general relation, which is the first step in abstraction, necessarily comes later than the discovery of the relations colligated. The union of a number of these lowest generalizations into a higher and more abstract generalization, is necessarily subsequent to the formation of such lowest generalizations. And so on continually, until the highest and most abstract generalizations have been reached.
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Herbert Spencer

Herbert Spencer

Herbert Spencer

Herbert Spencer
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