
The Principles of Biology, Volume 2 (of 2)
Herbert Spencer

THE CLASSIC COLLECTION · 1860
"First Principles" by Herbert Spencer is a philosophical treatise written in the mid-19th century. The work is part of a larger series that aims to establish a systematic understanding of philosophy grounded in science, religion, and human experience. It explores the interplay between religion and science, seeking to reconcile their seemingly opposing views on existence and knowledge, and discusses the underlying truths present across various belief systems. The opening of the treatise introduces the ambitious scope of Spencer’s work, as he presents a framework for his philosophical inquiry. He begins with a discussion on the nature of human beliefs, suggesting that even widely-held misconceptions may contain elements of truth. By analyzing the historical perspectives on authority and governance, Spencer underscores the evolution of political thought from divine kingship to modern democratic ideals. He proposes that there is a common thread among all religions and philosophies — the acknowledgment of fundamental truths concerning existence that are often obscured by dogma. Thus, the groundwork is laid for his exploration of "the unknowable" and the "laws of the knowable," setting the stage for a deeper analysis of both the limitations and possibilities of human understanding.
Introduction adapted from the source catalogue; source summaries may be automatically generated.
Free to read · English · 166,659 words · No account needed
MAKE TIME FOR A GOOD BOOK
On by default. Untick to stop anonymous reading totals. Each page counts after 10 seconds in view. How this works.
Anonymous counting is on unless you have switched it off.
§ 70. And here it may be remarked of Motion, as it was before of Matter, that its indestructibility is not only to be inductively inferred, but that it is a necessity of thought: its destructibility never having been truly conceived at all, but having always been, as it is now, a mere verbal proposition that cannot be realized in consciousness—a pseud-idea. Whether that absolute reality which produces in us the consciousness we call Motion, be or be not an eternal mode of the Unknowable, it is impossible for us to say; but that the relative reality which we call Motion never can come into existence, or cease to exist, is a truth involved in the very nature of our consciousness. To think of Motion as either being created or annihilated—to think of nothing becoming something, or something becoming nothing—is to establish in consciousness a relation between two terms of which one is absent from consciousness, which is impossible. The very nature of intelligence, negatives the supposition that Motion can be conceived (much less known) to either commence or cease.
§ 71. It remains to be pointed out that the continuity of Motion, as well as the indestructibility of Matter, is really known to us in terms of force. That a certain manifestation of force remains for ever undiminished, is the ultimate content of the thought; whether reached à posteriori or à priori.
From terrestrial physics let us take the case of sound propagated to a great distance. Whenever we are directly conscious of the causation of sound (namely, when we produce it ourselves), its invariable antecedent is force. The immediate sequence of this force we know to be motion—first, of our own organs, and then of the body which we set vibrating. The vibrations so generated we can discern both through the fingers and through the ears; and that the sensations received by the ears are the equivalents of mechanical force communicated to the air, and by it impressed on surrounding objects, we have clear proof when objects are fractured: as windows by the report of a cannon; or a glass vessel by a powerful voice. On what, then, rests the reasoning when, as occasionally happens under favourable circumstances, men on board a vessel a hundred miles from shore, hear the ringing of church-bells on placing their ears in the focus of the main sail; and when it is inferred that atmospheric undulations have traversed this immense distance? Manifestly, the assertion that the motion of the clapper, transformed into the vibrations of the bell, and communicated to the surrounding air, has propagated itself thus far on all sides, diminishing in intensity as the mass of air moved became greater, is based solely upon a certain change produced in consciousness through the ears. The listeners are not conscious of motion; they are conscious of an impression produced on them—an impression which implies a force as its necessary correlative. With force they begin, and with force they end: the intermediate motion being simply inferred. Again, where, as in celestial physics, the continuity of motion is quantitatively proved, the proof is not direct but inferential; and forces furnish the data for the inference. A particular planet can be identified only by its constant power to affect our visual organs in a special way—to impress upon the retina a group of forces standing in a particular correlation. Further, such planet has not been seen to move by the astronomical observer; but its motion is inferred from a comparison of its present position with the position it before occupied. If rigorously examined, this comparison proves to be a comparison between the different impressions produced on him by the different adjustments of the observing instruments. Going a step further back, it turns out that this difference is meaningless until shown to correspond with a certain calculated position which the planet must occupy, supposing that no motion has been lost. And if, finally, we examine the implied calculation, we find that it makes allowances for those accelerations and retardations which ellipticity of the orbit involves, as well as those variations of velocity caused by adjacent planets—we find, that is, that the motion is concluded to be indestructible not from the uniform velocity of the planet, but from the constant quantity of motion exhibited when allowance is made for the motion communicated to, or received from, other celestial bodies. And when we ask how this communicated motion is estimated, we discover that the estimate is based upon certain laws of force; which laws, one and all, embody the postulate that force cannot be destroyed. Without the axiom that action and re-action are equal and opposite, astronomy could not make its exact predictions; and we should lack the rigorous inductive proof they furnish that motion can never be lost, but can only be transferred.
Your reading position is saved on this browser. Take it to another device with a library code. Reading pages adapt to text, rather than matching a printed edition.

Herbert Spencer

Herbert Spencer

Herbert Spencer

Herbert Spencer
BEHIND THE BOOK
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook. Read the source licence.
The original source file, including credits and licence, is retained by this library. Request an original-format copy at no charge. Please include the book title and Project Gutenberg identifier #55046.
KEEP YOUR CURIOSITY GOING

David Patterson (Spirit) Hatch

David Patterson (Spirit) Hatch

David Patterson (Spirit) Hatch
Coulson Kernahan

Ralph Waldo Emerson
Frances Wright