Education and living
Randolph Silliman Bourne
THE CLASSIC COLLECTION · 1919
"Untimely Papers" by Randolph Silliman Bourne is a collection of essays written in the early 20th century, reflecting on the societal and psychological implications of war and culture during World War I. The work predominantly critiques the intellectual class's support for the war and delves into the burdens of conformity placed upon individuals by societal expectations. The primary focus revolves around the impact of war on personal identity, freedom, and the annulling of ideals. At the start of "Untimely Papers," the editor's foreword introduces the significance of Bourne's perspective as a leading voice among the intellectuals of his time, emphasizing his disillusionment with mainstream attitudes toward the war. Bourne portrays the harrowing challenge faced by individuals, exemplified by a young friend who grapples with forced conscription amid a prevailing sense of apathy and resentment. This friend, more a product of societal norms than a free agent, embodies the struggle to reconcile personal aspirations with external pressures, highlighting Bourne's profound exploration of individuality in the face of a wider collective mentality influenced by war and societal expectations.
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This war-technique compromises the outlines of American strategy because instead of making for a negotiated peace it has had the entirely unexpected result of encouraging those forces in the Allied countries who desire la victoire intégrale, the “knockout blow.” In the President’s war-message the country was assured that the principles of the negotiated peace remained quite unimpaired. The strategy that underlay this, it will be remembered, was to appeal to the Teutonic peoples over the heads of their rulers with terms so liberal that the peoples would force their governments to make peace. The strategy of the American government was, while prosecuting the war, to announce its war-aims and to persuade the Allies to announce their war-aims in such terms as would split the peoples of the Central Powers from their governments, thus bringing more democratic régimes that would provide a fruitful basis for a covenant of nations. We entered the war with no grievances of our own. It was our peculiar rôle to continue the initiative for peace, both by unmistakably showing our own purpose for a just peace based on some kind of international organization and by wielding a steady pressure on the Entente governments to ratify our programme. If we lost this initiative for peace, or if we were unable or unwilling to press the Entente toward an unmistakable liberalism, our strategy broke down and our justification for entering the war became seriously impaired. For we could then be charged with merely aiding the Entente’s ambiguous scheme of European reorganization.
The success of this strategy of peace depended on a stern disavowal of the illiberal programmes of groups within the Allied countries and a sympathetic attitude toward the most democratic programmes of groups within the enemy Powers. Anything which weakened either this disavowal or this sympathy would imperil our American case. As potential allies in this strategy the American government had within the enemies’ gates the followers of Scheidemann who said at the last sitting of the Reichstag: “If the Entente Powers should renounce all claims for annexation and indemnity and if the Central Powers should insist on continuing the war, a revolution will certainly result in Germany.” It is not inconceivable that the American government and the German socialists had at the back of their minds the same kind of a just peace. The fact that the German socialists were not opposing the German government did not mean that any peace move in which the former were interested was necessarily a sinister Hohenzollern intrigue. The bitterest enemies of Hollweg were not the radicals but the Pan-Germans themselves. It is they who were said to be circulating manifestoes through the army threatening revolution unless their programme of wholesale annexations is carried out. Whatever liberal reservoir of power there is in Germany, therefore, remains in the socialist ranks. If there is any chance of liberal headway against the sinister Pan-German campaign it is through this nucleus of liberal power. American strategy, if it has to find a liberal leverage in Germany, will have to choose the socialist group as against the Pan-Germans. It is not absolutely necessary to assume that the support of the Chancellor by the socialist majority is permanent. It is unplausible that the Scheidemann group coöperates with the Government for peace merely to consolidate the Junker and military class in power after the war. It is quite conceivable that the socialist majority desires peace in order to have a safe basis for a liberal overturn. Revolution, impossible while the Fatherland is in danger, becomes a practicable issue as soon as war is ended. A policy of aiding the Government in its pressure toward peace, in order to be in a tactical position to control the Government when the war-peril was ended, would be an extremely astute piece of statesmanship. There is no evidence that the German socialists are incapable of such far-sighted strategy. Certainly the “German peace” of a Scheidemann is bound to be entirely different from the “German peace” of a Hindenburg. This difference is one of the decisive factors of the American strategy. To ignore it is to run the risk of postponing and perhaps obstructing the settlement of the war.
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Randolph Silliman Bourne

Randolph Silliman Bourne
Randolph Silliman Bourne
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